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Method

🌳 Fault tree analysis (FTA)

Fault Tree Analysis uses deductive root-cause logic: start from a feared event and work backwards through logic gates to the basic failures that can cause it.

1What is fault tree analysis?

L'fault tree (Fault Tree Analysis, FTA) starts from a top event (the feared event to explain) and decomposes it logically through AND/OR gates, down to basic events (basic component failures) that are not decomposed further. It is a deductive approach: unlike FMEA, which starts with components and works towards effects, FTA starts from the feared effect and searches for its causes.

It also supports probability calculation. The top-event probability is derived from basic-event probabilities combined using gate logic (AND = product, OR = union), while identifying minimal cut sets reveals the shortest combinations of failures leading to the feared event.

2Method steps

  1. Define the top event — the feared event to explain, stated precisely.
  2. Identify immediate causes and connect them through an AND gate (all are required) or an OR gate (any one is sufficient).
  3. Decompose recursively each intermediate cause until reaching basic events (component failure, human error or external condition).
  4. Assign a probability to each basic event.
  5. Calculate the top-event probability by working up the tree using gate logic.
  6. Extract minimal cut sets using MOCUS—the shortest combinations of basic events sufficient to cause the top event.
Minimal cut sets containing a single basic event are single points of failure and deserve priority well before cut sets containing three or four combined events.

3Example completed in Polyodos

Section to be completed — step-by-step example such as an uncommanded line shutdown, with Polyodos screenshots, probability calculation and MOCUS minimal cut sets.

4Common mistakes

MistakeWhy it is a problem
Confusing AND and OR gatesUsing an AND gate instead of an OR gate severely underestimates the top-event probability. Gate logic must match the system's physical reality.
Decomposing to an irrelevant levelExcessive decomposition buries the tree in details with no reliable probability data. Stop where a credible probability can be assigned.
Ignoring repeated eventsA basic event appearing in several branches is not independent of itself. The minimal-cut-set algorithm must account for it; a naive probability calculation does not.

5Further reading

FR